Open letter to European leaders

Brussels, Saturday, 13 December 2003. Conclusions of the Italian Presidency following the summit at which the European Council dealt with the draft constitution: ‘The European Council noted that it was not possible for the Intergovernmental Conference to reach overall agreement on a draft constitutional treaty at this stage. The Irish Presidency is requested, on the basis of consultations, to make an assessment of the prospects for progress and to report to the European Council in March.’

Six months, in other words, will not have been enough to bring an agreement to fruition. We knew that the new Member States needed time. So, evidently, do the present Fifteen.

Observers are always inclined to trace major events back to little incidents, to anecdotal roots: to one person’s hidden agenda, to the secret hopes of another or to the tactlessness of a third. The truth is simpler and more compelling: in December 2003, virtually all European leaders supported the draft, but those who felt more comfortable without a constitution outnumbered those who wanted it to be approved immediately, which would then have necessitated its ratification and, shortly afterwards, its application.

These sentiments are understandable, and I am not one of those who would blame you for adopting such a stance; the stakes, after all, are high. Giving guidelines to a negotiator is one thing; measuring the consequences of a political revolution such as the one that underlies the draft European Constitution is quite another. It is not only a matter of creating European leaders with their own legitimacy who would thus be ‘in competition’ with national leaders. Every government will need to reorganise itself radically if it is to play an effective part in the new European Council of Ministers. Every national parliament will have to adapt if it is to keep tabs on the application of the subsidiarity principle. The top people in politics, administration and the media will feel prompted to envisage careers in the European arena, while political parties, trade unions and the media will have to learn to work in European structures. In most of the countries concerned, if not in all of them, the people should be given the final say by means of a referendum. This constitution will essentially mark the birth of a political Europe in an area where ‘proper’ politics has hitherto remained confined within national walls.

It is therefore understandable that a degree of hesitation, and something akin to vertigo, should be experienced by those on the verge of such a step. It is also fairly certain that the constitution will scarcely undergo any alteration in the depths of winter. It would, be dangerous, however, to leave it on the back burner beyond the next solstice in June, the date on which a new European Parliament will take up its duties, followed by a new Commission. Several Member States will have new leaders too. The constitution will remain a pre-eminent technical reference work, but the consensus that brought it to life will have melted away.

For some months now, as everyone concedes in private, you have seen for yourselves, in the hullabaloo of the travelling circus that the European Council and the Council of Ministers have become, that with 25 members, each seated round the table with an entourage of half a dozen colleagues, the ‘club’ has taken on a very different character. The old procedures, methods and rules no longer work. December’s impasse demonstrated to the remaining doubters that it is impossible for 25 members to achieve unanimity on any subject. At a time when its economy has stalled, Europe has become unable to take decisions. At a time when it has to decide on its future funding, Europe is paralysed. The great aims you set on the competitiveness of the economy, on the fight against terrorism and on sustainable development were already very ambitious when there were 15 Member States; they are entirely beyond the reach of a 25-member Union operating on the basis of the old treaties.

The work of the Convention, like the continuing failure of the Intergovernmental Conference thereafter, has shown that the draft constitution is the only instrument with the potential to attract a broad consensus within the enlarged Union. None of you considers it perfect, but all of you deem it acceptable. It enables every country to live happily in the Union while enabling the Union itself to be effective. Negotiations can be resumed when all of you understand this and realise that each is a prisoner of the others. Countries that claim to prefer the Treaty of Nice to the draft constitution cannot go on indefinitely obstructing what the great majority of their partners regard as indispensable progress. At the same time, the latter must realise that, since your differences relate to the decision-making process, the idea of a fast lane makes no sense as a means of overcoming that particular blockage. The countries that have merged their currencies can conduct their monetary policy in a closed circle. Similarly, those who want to amalgamate their foreign policies may do so without waiting for the others. But what can be done if all Member States accept the full range of powers but not the procedure for exercising them? Talk of a ‘fast lane’ or ‘pioneering group’ in that context is an empty threat.

The ideal schedule for the unification of Europe would have been a political agreement on a federal or community structure, followed by an agreement on the division of powers, followed by enlargement. The first step, in practice, has been to assign considerable powers to Europe, from the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 to the Treaty of Amsterdam; then it was decided to enlarge the Union, extending its borders across the length and breadth of the continent; only then came the search for an effective and democratic form of government, from which the federal model emerged. It is no use crying over spilt milk; there was probably no alternative. But the result of this sequence of events is that each of us depends on all the others. Without the proponents of the European free-trade area, the advocates of a powerful Europe cannot progress any further. Conversely, however, if the free-traders persisted in their opposition to the emergence of Europe as a global power, the less ‘European-minded’ states would witness the inexorable disintegration of the economic area itself.

We are about to be given the first historic opportunity to unite the continent within a single political entity. But it will also be the last – at least for a long time.

Alain Lamassoure, 20 December 2003