Relaunching Europe through defence

Michèle Alliot-Marie likes to repeat, not without reason, that following the run of serious crises that shook the European Union in 2005, defence is without doubt one of the areas in which there is a chance of relaunching the European political project.

Of all the paradoxes that have marked the process of building Europe since its origins, that of defence is one of the most astonishing. In a dangerous world, nothing unites people more than the existence of a common enemy. At the height of the cold war, Western Europe found itself up against the worst imaginable enemy: the Soviet Union, which threatened us from without and within and was aiming apocalyptic weapons at our civilian populations. The fact that Jean Monnet had proposed the creation of a European Defence Community even before the very first European agreement on the Coal and Steel Community was implemented, therefore comes as no surprise. Yet on 30 August 1954, the French Parliament rejected that treaty, less for fear of too much European integration than because it still felt a huge distrust of Germany: less than ten years had passed since the Liberation.

For half a century, the rejection of the EDC meant that European integration was redirected towards civilian objectives – the market, currency, the free movement of persons, the environment, etc. – and the defence of the continent was entrusted to a larger alliance, NATO, heavily dominated by the American ‘big brother’. Surprisingly enough, that division of tasks survived the cold war. When the USSR fell apart, thereby consigning the Warsaw Pact to oblivion, NATO not only survived but took in Eastern Europe. The Americans, backed by the UK and most of our partners, continued vigorously seeking to maintain the Atlantic Alliance’s monopoly to defend the continent against the new threats of the post-cold war era. In the military area, in total contradiction with the subsidiarity principle, the European Union could therefore take action on secondary issues (sending the blue berets to faraway countries), but had no legal rights over the vital issue of defending Europe against common threats!

That doctrine, which was as contrary to Europe’s interests as it was to common sense, was smashed to pieces by the impact of the realities of the new world. NATO intervention is now justified only in the event of a threat so great as to make it appear indispensable to turn to the political leadership and military resources of the American superpower. When the Balkan wars began, the Americans rightly felt that it was up to the Europeans to restore order in their own ‘back yard’. It then emerged, however, that despite two million armed troops, the lack of a common politico-military organisation meant that the 15 EU countries were incapable of overcoming the modest Serbian army!

The EU learned a lesson from the humiliation it suffered in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. Europe realised that as the number one trading power in the world it now had international responsibilities that meant it could no longer remain a military dwarf. At first, so as not to offend the sensibilities of its most pro-Alliance members, or of the countries most attached to their traditional neutrality, there were references only to ‘security’ and humanitarian tasks; then, little by little and crisis after crisis (Kosovo, Macedonia, 9/11, etc.), the taboo word ‘defence’ came into use. It is revealing that it was the British Government, in the person of Tony Blair, that took the initiative of giving the European Union a defence dimension, at the Franco-British summit of Saint-Malo in 1998.

Since then, Europe has made rapid progress on all aspects of the question: agreement among governments to make common military resources available (13 tactical groups of 1 500 troops by the year 2010); increased number of common armaments programmes (Airbus A 400M transport planes, drones, frigates, aircraft carriers, cruise missiles, observation satellites, and so forth); the creation of political, military and industrial agencies (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, EU Military Staff, civilian/military planning cell, European Defence Agency); conduct of operations under European command (Concordia, Artemis, Althea, missions in Aceh and Gaza); first units of a European police corps. Agreements have even been reached on task sharing with NATO, although some uncertainties, contradictions and rivalries remain.

The net result is that the construction of a Defence Europe can now draw on the experience acquired over some ten years and on a common resolve among the main European governments, a more understanding attitude in Washington and great expectations on the part of European public opinion.

Even in the absence of the political and legal basis of a Constitution, progress can still be made. One major step should be official and formal recognition that the Union bears primary responsibility for the future of European security. It could take the form of a White Paper on European security. In that document, the Member States would draw up a common diagnosis of the threats facing the present generation of Europeans (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, insecurity in neighbouring states, etc.) and decide on the political and military resources needed to tackle them, on a case-by-case basis, either with or without our allies.

The next step would be to enact a European military planning law, designed to reflect these political commitments in budgetary terms for a period of five years. It would be an intergovernmental budget, covering not the total of Member States’ military budgets but the resources each of them would be prepared to fund from its national budget in order to participate in the common security and defence policy.

The EU budget, which also has a multiannual framework and covers purely civilian expenditure, would thus be supplemented by an intergovernmental security and defence budget. The latter could relate to the period 2009-2013, which would be consistent with the timetable of the current French planning law (which expires in 2008) and with the European Council’s decision to update the EU’s budgetary policy in 2008, while also allowing reasonable preparation time.

As a major factor in relaunching Europe, such a measure could also help ensure that military budgets are not sacrificed (too heavily) to the active policy to improve public finances that will have to be conducted in the half dozen countries – including France – where debt is reaching an intolerable level. We must takes steps to protect our future.

Alain Lamassoure, 23 December 2005