The European Constitution should give a new direction to Turkish membership

Under the slogan ‘No to a Turkish Europe!’ some opponents of the European Constitution are calling on voters to merge the issues of the Constitution and Turkey’s application for accession. They say that the best way to prevent Turkey from joining the European Union is to reject the Constitution.

Quite the reverse is true.

First of all, the two issues are clearly different: one concerns the rules governing the way the club works, the other the identity of its members. The truth of this lies in the fact that alongside those in favour of saying ‘yes’ to both (Jacques Chirac, the majority of the Socialist Party) or ‘no’ to both (Laurent Fabius, Philippe de Villiers, Jean-Marie Le Pen), we find supporters of ‘no’ to the Constitution and ‘yes’ to Turkey (the Socialist Party minority and the Communist Party) while the UMP, the UDF, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and major socialist figures (Robert Badinter) are campaigning for ‘yes’ to the Constitution and ‘no’ to Turkey. In any case, that is why these two separate issues are to be dealt with in two separate referendums.

Furthermore, the text of the Constitution submitted for referendum no more provides for Turkey’s accession than does the Treaty of Nice. In legal terms this means that one or other text would have to be amended either before or at the same time as the accession treaty. In particular, the position of the new Member State both within the institutions (right to vote, number of MEPs) and in relation to the budget would have to be defined beforehand, as expressly stated by the European Council of 17 December.

Lastly, and most importantly, the entry into force of the Constitution will give the supporters of a privileged partnership much stronger means of making their voice heard than they have today.

– The Constitution expressly provides that the Union can propose that kind of system, which does not exist under the existing treaties, to neighbouring countries. The European Convention drafted Article 57 for precisely that purpose. It opens the way to an intermediate status between full accession and association or cooperation agreements as we know them.

– National parliaments have been given a major role to play throughout the accession process.

. They are now the first to be notified of an application (Article 58(2)) and each state is free to express its view from the outset, in accordance with its respective national constitutional requirements. France must take advantage of its constitutional reform, which will precede ratification of the Constitution, to clarify how the National Assembly and the Senate are to be involved in this regard.

. That same reform will also allow our parliament to deliver its opinion, through a resolution and a vote, at every stage of the negotiations on the treaty with Turkey. The European Council decision provided that each of the 30 negotiating chapters required a unanimous decision by the Member States: the National Assembly and the Senate will be able to state their position on all of them.

. The Constitution provides for interparliamentary conferences involving all the national parliaments, which may forward opinions (‘contributions’) to the European institutions on any matter of common interest. It should be noted that contrary to what is often said there is also strong opposition to Turkey’s entry among several of our partners, especially Germany, Austria, Hungary and the three Benelux countries.

– Citizens themselves will acquire powerful means of influence:

. Through the election of the European Parliament and the President of the Commission. Parliament will acquire full legislative power, jointly with the Council (Article 20 of the Constitution). Henceforth it will elect the President of the Commission, which means that if the European political parties get themselves organised (as they intend to do), it is the citizens themselves who will elect the President of the Union’s executive through their vote at the European elections (Article 27). If the Constitution is implemented, as from June 2009 European political parties will each present a common programme and a common candidate: there is no doubt that a party’s position on Turkey’s application will be a deciding factor for many French voters.

. Through an entirely new right of collective petition. One million European citizens (just under 3 per 1000 voters!), who are nationals of various countries, may at any time invite the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on a matter (Article 47(4)). There are so many issues directly related to Turkey’s application (budget, agricultural policy, free movement of persons, etc.) that authors of petitions will be spoilt for choice.

– Part I of the Constitution (especially Articles 2 and 3) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Part II set out a detailed and precise list of the rights and principles that every Member State must respect in the Union. That will make it easier to oppose Turkey’s application on the basis, in particular, of the provisions on women’s rights, freedom of expression, cultural diversity and the rights of minorities.

– At worst, if the course of the negotiations tends to drive France into relative isolation because of its support for privileged partnership, French leaders supported by public opinion could resort to the threat contained in Article 60 of the Constitution: the right to unilateral withdrawal, a guarantee of national sovereignty, which does not exist in the current treaties. In so doing, France could send out an extremely strong message to its partners: ‘Either Turkey or me’. Obviously, this is a deterrent weapon that has to be wielded with extreme circumspection, but like any such weapon, the simple fact that it exists makes it more of a deterrent.

In conclusion, in accordance with the spirit of the treaties, at this moment in time the procedures for negotiations with the applicants for accession are of a diplomatic and intergovernmental nature. The negotiations are taking place behind closed doors (like the 1999 Helsinki European Council or the December 2004 European Council), the French Parliament has no vote, the powers that be revel in that fact that they can deliberately ignore public opinion: transparency and democracy end where Europe begins. With the Constitution, on the contrary, the European Union will become as much the business of citizens as of those who govern them. The house rules on family life (the Constitution) and membership of the European family will no longer be decided by the heads of the family alone, but by all its members.

Alain Lamassoure, 18 February 2005